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THE ORIGINS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
by 
James V. Spickard 
University of Redlands 
© 1999 
Presents the history of the 1948 adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, focusing on the prior status of human 
rights in international law and on the cultural/ideological aspects of 
the debates surrounding its adoption.  This chapter shows both the 
Western origins of the core human rights concepts and the positive-
law nature of the Universal Declaration.  It also shows that the 
cultural issues were present from the very start of the modern human 
rights era. 
Late in the evening of December 9th, 1948, Haitian Senator 
Emile Saint-Lot rose to present a draft resolution on human rights to 
the United Nations General Assembly.  It was a proud day for this 
descendant of slaves.  As Rapporteur for the U.N.'s Third 
Committee--in charge of social, humanitarian, and cultural 
concerns--he was bringing forward a document that had run a two-
year gauntlet of commissions, councils, committees, and study-
groups.  Though not perfect, he said, the resolution that had emerged 
was a fitting counterweight to the recently ended World War.  "A 
little over eight years ago," he proclaimed 
the forces of evil had been let loose to compass the destruction 
of the spiritual and moral values which represented for the 
majority of mankind the sole reason for living. 
At a moment when the greatest confusion reigned in that 
epic struggle, the clear and sincere voice of President 
Roosevelt had rallied the hopes of those who for centuries had 
been seeking the path of justice and liberty amid the tortuous 
ways of iniquity.  When President Roosevelt proclaimed that 
all men should enjoy freedom of conscience and freedom of 
expression, that they should be free from want and free from 
fear, he overcame the last doubts of the waverers, for his 
appeal was genuine and expressed clearly the aspirations of 
twentieth century man.1
Roosevelt's speech on the Four Freedoms, he declared, had 
been the impetus driving the various U.N. bodies--the Economic and 
Social Council, the Human Rights Commission, the Third 
Committee, and others--to complete their work.  How fitting it was 
that the President's widow, Eleanor, now sat as Chairman of Human 
Rights Commission.  Her perseverance, her ability to rise above 
politics, her knack of finding the common ground between 
ideological opponents had brought forth a document that Saint-Lot 
described as "the greatest effort yet made by mankind to give society 
new legal and moral foundations."  How appropriate for the 
Declaration to be ratified in Paris, "the capital of liberty"!  And how 
honored was he, representing a country that had long ago fought its 
way out of slavery, to be the one chosen to present the Commission's 
draft for final approval. 
It had already been a busy day for the Assembly.  Delegates 
had just that afternoon approved a Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  Earlier in the fall they had 
hammered out agreements on ..... The "Draft Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights" now before them2 was the culmination of a series 
of documents that many thought would set the tone for the post-War 
era.  Many yearned for the dawn of a freer, more peaceful, more 
optimistic, and more progressive age.  If remarriage is the triumph of 
love over experience, these early years of the United Nations were 
the triumph of hope after a generation of catastrophes: two World 
Wars bracketing the Great Depression.  The inter-war League of 
Nations had failed.  The United Nations was dedicated to bringing 
about a world in which peace, hope, and freedom could succeed. 
Yet the draft that Saint-Lot presented to the delegates was not 
quite what they had expected.  Instead of a Covenant, with concrete 
applications, enforcement procedures, and so on, they had a mere 
statement of principles.  "All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights.  ...  Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the 
security of person. ... No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. ... 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment ..."  So read the draft, as it called out a litany of 
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rights and freedoms due to all persons, "without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status." 
As the Eastern Bloc representatives noted throughout the 
debate, these principles were both vague and impractical.3  The 
Declaration was to be "a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations."  It called on everyone to work for its 
implementation.  Yet it was not self-implementing.  It made few 
clear distinctions, established no courts, and laid down no clear 
penalties.  It was a declaration of intent, not of law.  In the words of 
the Australian representative, "the Declaration imposes no legal 
obligation and requires no measures for" enforcement.4
Even its intent was open to interpretation.  Article Five5 
prohibited "torture or ... cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment."  What constitutes "degrading treatment"?  Do all 
society's consider the same things "inhuman"?  Article 18 gave 
everyone "the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion."  
This seems to treat religions as belief systems--something true in the 
West but not for Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, or Confucianists.6  This 
matter was never discussed.  Did the right to work (Article 23) imply 
that governments must be employers of last resort?  Were rights to 
"periodic holidays with pay" (Article 24) of equal importance with 
"freedom of opinion and expression" (Article 19) and if so, how were 
they to be reconciled with  seemingly unlimited right to own (and 
use) property (Article 17)--which in some countries, at least, let the 
owners of industry set the rules of the workplace? 
As several of the delegates remarked, the practical problems 
were immense, even involving such questions as whether "the right 
to freedom of movement and residence" (Article 13) could overturn 
local zoning laws.  The draft answered none of these questions.  It 
provided no means for adjudication, and prior committee work had 
explicitly rejected a proposed Soviet amendment committing each 
nation to guarantee the rights in domestic law.7  Though ringing with 
ideals, the draft was short on specifics--the very specifics that could 
turn ideals into social policy.  Yet it was all that the delegates thought 
they could accomplish.  And it was much more than had been done 
before. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was, indeed, the 
crowning point of the U.N.'s third session--and was among its last 
idealistic accomplishments before that organization was crippled by 
the emerging Cold War.  The U.N. Charter implicitly called for such 
a declaration.  It mentioned human rights in several places, but it 
nowhere defined them.  A brief review of that Charter and of the 
history of international human rights legislation makes clear the 
Declaration's revolutionary scope.  It also makes clear the problems 
with the human rights concept that the Declaration inherited. 
Let us start with the U.N. Charter itself.  That 1945 document 
declared among the organization's purposes  
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion ...[Article 1.3] 
Article 55 held similar language: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self determination of peoples, the United Nations 
shall promote: 
a.  ... [economic progress] 
b.  ... [international problem solving and cooperation] 
c.  universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion. 
The Charter also committed the organization and various of its 
bodies to make recommendations promoting such rights (Articles 
13.1.b and 62).  Article 68 set up commissions to carry out such 
work.   
These passages did not define human rights, though they 
outlawed discrimination based on the four criteria mentioned.  All 
recognized at the time that some sort of further definition was 
needed.  Indeed, President Truman referred to a future agreement on 
rights in his closing speech to the 1945 San Francisco Conference 
where the U.N. Charter was shaped.  
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Yet the Charter almost lacked even these clauses.  The 1944 
Dunbarton Oaks agreement between Nationalist China, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, which led to the 
post-War United Nations, had even vaguer references.  John 
Humphrey, the Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights 
during the organization's first two decades, reports that the Charter 
language was the work of intense lobbying by nongovernmental 
organizations at the 1945 San Francisco Conference.8  Though some 
diplomats favored stronger measures, few thought their adoption 
possible.  Only a last-minute decision by Edward Stettinius, 
President Truman's Secretary of State, committed the U.S. to 
including rights language.  He then persuaded the other Great Powers 
to accede. 
Still the Charter held further ambiguities.  Article 56 
committed members "to take joint and separate action in cooperation 
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55", the key rights article.  Because the Charter is a treaty 
between states--and has thus the force of law--this passage provided 
a firm legal ground for international human rights activism.  Both 
member states and the organization are obligated to "promote ... 
universal respect for, and observance of" the human rights that the 
Charter failed to enumerate.   
But the Charter also declared in the Article 2 that  
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter ... 
If a member state claims that its laws conform to the vague 
references to human rights contained in the charter, or if its violations 
of human rights affect only its own citizens, the U.N. cannot legally 
intervene to stop them.  U.N. activism was thus from the beginning 
limited to wielding verbal carrots and sticks.  To the degree that 
human rights are national rather than international matters, the 
organization can cajole and censure its members but it cannot act 
forcefully.  Without further treaty law, the Charter's human rights 
passages faced becoming mere pieties. 
The Origins of International Law 
We cannot appreciate how radical were even these pieties 
without understanding something about the origins of Western 
international law.  International law is part of the modern European 
state system, which emerged with the Treaty of Westphalia in the 
middle of the 17th century.  Its key concept is 'sovereignty'--the 
notion that a state has absolute authority over its own behavior.  
International law limits that behavior.  The question is: on what 
grounds are such limiting laws established? 
The notion of 'state sovereignty' has roots in ancient Greece 
and Rome.  Aristotle sorted states according to how they made laws: 
monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies.  Each state was 
sovereign--independent of the others.  No state could legislate for 
others.  As Stanley Benn points out, however, for the Greeks 
"legislation was the local application of a divinely ordained order, 
rather than the authoritative creation of new laws."9  Greek  states 
were bound to recognize a higher authority, though not the authority 
of other states except by conquest.  Roman ideas were more 
autocratic: no one could question the ruler's laws, as he (the pronoun 
is apt) embodied the authority of the Roman people.  Yet Benn notes 
that "the emperor was supreme because his function was to command 
what was right and for the public good."  Justice ruled Will, not the 
other way around. 
This tension between power and morality runs through the 
entire Western political tradition.  Medieval thinkers gave 
considerable weight to the latter.  Aquinas, for example, subjected 
kings not only to divine and natural law, but to the customs of their 
realms.10  Such customs most often divided sovereignty among 
various noble ranks, each with rights and duties against the others.  
Overlapping sovereignties were personalistic as much as they were 
legal.  Rights and duties were passed by inheritance and gift, and 
were separable both from each other and from the territories to which 
they supposedly applied.  As Benedict Anderson has pointed out, 
even while strong kings emerged in England and France in the early 
modern period, monarchical rulership was an  
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older imagining, where states were defined by centres, borders 
were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded 
imperceptibly into one another.11
The situation of modern Andorra--which owes dual allegiance to the 
French state and to a Spanish bishop--was the rule rather than the 
exception. 
Anderson rightly notes that medieval and early modern 
monarchs ruled over remarkably diverse populations, of which the 
final Habsburg's titles are an apt remembrance: "Emperor of Austria; 
King of Hungary, of Bohemia, of Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, 
Galicia, Lodomeria, and Illyria ..." and so on through fifty or so 
honorifics.12  After 1800, such multi-national empires were less and 
less possible; in the new republics sovereignty became tied to 'the 
people', who soon came to see themselves as 'nations'.  The 
remaining kings and princes self-consciously remade themselves as 
nationalists--though the irony of an England that has not been ruled 
by an 'English' monarch since the 11th century should not pass 
without remark.13  In either case, modern 
state sovereignty is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over 
each square centimetre of a legally defined territory.14
Anderson traces the consequences of this change for the growth of 
nationalism.  For our purposes, it is enough to note that in the 
modern state system, each person is ruled by some state, either as 
subject or as citizen.  Sovereignty rests with the state, not with any 
higher body.  Though some states call their citizens 'sovereign', the 
state itself is deemed to be the proxy for such citizen-sovereignty; in 
effect the modern republican state carries the mantle woven by the 
European monarchs of three centuries ago.15   
This state system emerged in Europe at least partly in 
response to the brutality of the Thirty Years War (1618-48).  In 
opposition to feudalism with its conflicting sovereignties, it set one 
sovereign prince over each piece of territory, holding complete sway 
over that land and its inhabitants.  It specifically rejected custom as a 
limit on that sovereign's power.  As the 16th century French 
philosopher Jean Bodin articulated this notion, the sovereign rules 
absolutely and cannot be subject to any curb; he makes the laws for 
his subjects, not they for him.  No custom, no tradition, no churchly 
subservience, no dual allegiance; nothing stands in the way of the 
sovereign's will.  According to Bodin, his only checks are the laws of 
God and nature, plus the fundamental laws of the state's constitution.  
Though these may see to be superior 'laws', Bodin treated divine and 
natural law as moral, not legal, and so they were outside his system 
(as they were not for Aquinas).  Constitutional law governed such 
things as succession and so merely determined who would be ruler, 
not how he ruled.  For Bodin, it anchored the sovereign's claim to 
authority and was thus formal, not substantive.  The result was 
sovereign absolutism: the view that underlies the modern state 
system.  Real 'law' is whatever the sovereign wills.16
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) radicalized Bodin's views in 
response to the chaos of the English Civil War.  Rather than 
relegating divine and natural law to morality, he abolished them 
altogether.  Though clearly influenced by Puritan notions of God's 
omnipotence and of the covenantal community of believers,17 he 
redefined "natural law" and "natural right" to be properties of 
individuals.  "Natural right" describes every individual's 'right' to 
self-protection, while "natural law" describes the moral conclusions 
any rational individual would 'naturally' draw from the war of all 
against all that the unguarded pursuit of "natural right" brings.  
Hobbes thought that the fear of death at others' hands 'naturally' leads 
individuals to subject themselves to an all-powerful sovereign.  They 
give up their "natural right" to self-protection so that they can 
survive.  "Natural law" thus amounts to the honoring of their own 
surrender of their rights to each other and to their ruler.   
In essence, Hobbes located sovereignty in each individual but 
believed that the resulting chaos demands that these individuals 
surrender their sovereignty to a single lord.  This ruler is absolute: 
limited by neither law, right, nor morality.  'Law' is what the ruler 
wills, individuals have surrendered their 'right', and 'morality' is, in 
Hobbes' eyes, merely a fancy term for whatever people desire.  None 
of these stands over the sovereign, curbing his or her actions.  He or 
she is also not limited by any constitution.  Instead, the sovereign 
rules only so long as "the power lasteth, by which he is able to 
protect" his subjects.18  The ruler can thus do whatever he or she 
wants; so long as the commonwealth stays orderly, no outside law 
can stand judge.   
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Charles II, Hobbes's student and patron, clearly saw both the 
merits and defects of this scheme.  It sustained absolutism but not 
necessarily monarchy: a legislature could exercise sovereignty as 
well.  By freeing the sovereign from divine and natural law, Hobbes 
unleashed power but cost kingship the legitimacy that 'rulership by 
divine right' brings.  Charles gave Hobbes a sinecure after the 1660 
Restoration, but soon forbade him from publishing.  
Bodin and Hobbes are worth this small detour because their 
thinking epitomizes an approach to sovereignty that has governed 
most states to the present day.  For them, the ruler is paramount.  
Sovereignty is subject to no internal limits except self-declared ones, 
such as those in the U.S. Constitution.19  Sovereignty is subject to no 
external limits whatsoever.  Though princes or legislatures can agree 
among themselves to restrict their actions, such bans are based solely 
on their free (and continued) consent.  All law is thus domestic.  
'International law' stems from the free agreement of independent 
sovereigns, not from any higher power.  Article 2 of the U.N. Charter 
thus claims that the organization is based on the sovereign equality of 
all members.  States are thus not bound to other states except by their 
own permission.   
Treaties constitute such permission, and the main political 
difficulties faced by the early proponents of international human 
rights law stemmed from various governments' reluctance to give up 
'national sovereignty' to anyone.  The Truman Administration kept 
the U.N. Charter weaker than it would have liked because it worried 
that the Senate might not ratify a treaty that took away too much U.S. 
power.  It nixed Soviet amendments to the human rights Declaration 
out of similar fears.20  Other countries had matching qualms, though 
only the 'Great Powers' had the political muscle to shape 
international agreements to their liking.  Monarchy or democracy, 
capitalist or socialist, states have proved remarkably reluctant to cede 
their powers.    
Positive versus Natural Law 
Given this state system, based in sovereignty, what supports 
human rights law?  How can we justify human rights standards?  And 
which standards should we justify?  These questions stood at the 
center of the 1948 U.N. debates, and the direction that those debates 
took accounts for the imprecision of the Declaration that emerged.  
There are, in general, two approaches to this issue.  Positivists argue 
that human rights are created by international agreements, nothing 
more.  No superior standard is either possible or necessary.  Natural 
law theorists, on the other hand, argue that agreement is not enough.  
People can--and do--agree to the most unspeakable acts.  Human 
rights are rights, even if no one agrees to them.  Natural law theorists, 
however, differ about whether these rights are based in religion, 
reason, or human nature. 
Though there are other approaches, most human rights 
theorists fall into one of these two camps.  This is not the place for a 
long exposition, but a brief introduction to each now will clarify the 
issues involved and the conflict surrounding human rights today. 
In the Hobbesian tradition, international law is 'positive law': 
law freely entered into and agreed upon by states sovereign over their 
own territories and peoples.  It is based in nothing but self-interest, 
and needs no other basis to bind states together.  For this approach--
the dominant practical philosophy governing the affairs of nations--
international law is based in politics, not in morality or philosophy.  
Though these latter factors may influence the goals toward which 
political dealing aims, international law does not depend on them.  
Politics is about power, and international law is thus also about 
power: in Ivo Duchacek's words, "who leads whom, with what intent, 
for what purpose, by what means, and with what restraints."21
Seen in this way, international law provides no room for 
'human rights' per se, except as those rights are embodied in 
treaties.22  For legal positivists, 'human rights' are precisely those 
rights that states have granted.  States are the players in this game, 
not individuals.  A state's legitimacy arises not from any 
supranational standard, but from its ability to protect its citizens.  
Anything that weakens it is not just a threat to its sovereignty, but a 
threat to its being.  Richard Falk points out that this "statist logic" is 
but one of several possible approaches to human rights; respecting 
human rights can even strengthen states in some circumstances.  Yet 
all but one of his other "logics" are also positivist: i.e., they see rights 
as the result of an agreement between peoples, not as something 
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basic to which human law must conform.  Falk notes that state-
centered positivism is by far the dominant legal "logic" in the modern 
world.23   
Few human rights philosophers are legal positivists, as 
positivism provides no firm ground from which to criticize existing 
legal systems.  Positivism can criticize states for their failure to 
enforce the international laws and treaties to which they have agreed, 
but it cannot criticize them for actions that conform to their own legal 
codes.  How could it do so?  Positivism sees agreements as the 
highest standard to which humans can be held.  If states (or Great 
Powers, international organizations, transnational interest groups, or 
'the people', to list Falk's other potential loci of human rights 
pressure) have not agreed that a particular action is wrong, then it is 
not wrong!  Positivists see human rights as the result of an 
international consensus embodied in treaties between states.  As 
David Forsythe, who wrote the first textbook on human rights 
politics, put it, "human rights is what the law says it is, however 
much philosophers may debate."24  Though Forsythe only claims that 
this describes the actual workings of human rights law, true 
positivists take a similar stand on principle. 
Natural law theorists oppose legal positivism, claiming that 
there must be better grounds than mere agreement on which to base 
notions of rights.25  Various natural law doctrines posit key 
principles that they claim states 'must' recognize, on pain of losing 
their moral legitimacy.  These principles stand above human law and 
provide standards by which to judge it.  For example, Greek and 
Roman laws were supposed to conform to 'justice'--something 
beyond law that gave the law its legitimacy--though Plato showed in 
the Republic and the Gorgias just how difficult it can be to specify a 
'just' act.  Medieval Christian scholars found justice in the revealed 
laws of God and decried as unjust any laws that contravened them.  
Catholic moral philosophy has its origins here, as do most systems of 
religious ethics.26   
Yet the problem with basing human rights on religion is 
obvious: not everyone has the same religion, and not all of the 'gods' 
speak with one voice.27  To posit one god as right and another as 
wrong can itself be justified in only two ways.  Either one can 
compare various gods' edicts to some superior law, with the prize 
going to the god who conforms most closely.  Or one can claim that 
only one god is 'true', while all others are 'false'.  But to do the first is 
to set the law above god, a thing few religionists wish to do.  And if 
one tries to justify the second claim rationally, one is in effect 
comparing a god to a superior 'truth'--which is much the same as 
measuring a god by a superior 'law'.  One can, of course, kill or 
convert one's opponents, thus eliminating their gods from the game; 
this is not generally considered a fair tactic, though. 
As many Christian theologians have noted, the question "Is 
God just?" either forces God to submit to an external standard of 
justice or it is tautology: justice is defined as what God does.  Jack 
Miles notes that when Job questioned the Hebrew God's justice, He 
responded with an imperious non-answer and then fell silent, to 
remain so through the rest of the Hebrew scriptures.28  Would that all 
gods were so honest. 
Early modern philosophers eschewed such religious appeals; 
the twentieth century decline of public religion banned them as well 
from mainstream political life, though they have continued in certain 
spheres.29  Philosophers substituted appeals to 'reason' and to 'the 
laws of human nature' for 'the laws of God'.  John Locke (1632-
1704), for example, held that natural law began in God's will but 
could be discovered by human reason.  He began his Second Treatise 
of Government with a depiction of a 'state of nature' in which men 
(sic) are bound to preserve peace, preserve humanity, and refrain 
from hurting one another.  He claimed that people do not need any 
special help to know this law, but as all do not comply with it, reason 
leads them to institute a social contract for their mutual protection.  
Unlike Hobbes, Locke did not believe that this contract requires 
people to give up their natural rights.  Indeed, he preserved their right 
to rebel against their rulers if the rulers "wage war" against them.  
Society begins, for him, with individuals naturally knowing the good; 
any government that violates that good has lost its legitimacy and 
deserves to be overthrown.30
As many scholars have pointed out, and as we shall see in 
more detail in the following chapters, this is a very ethnocentric and 
time-bound image.  C.B. Macpherson called it "the political theory of 
possessive individualism," a term as descriptive as it is gentle.31  For 
what rights does Locke suppose are universal?  Self-preservation is 
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key, as is individual freedom, but soon after these comes the right to 
own property.32  For Locke, a main purpose of the state is to secure 
property and to regulate its use, distribution, and transference.  
Though the reasonableness of this 'right' may have been apparent to 
the merchant and proto-industrial classes of Locke's own day, one 
has trouble imagining tribal peoples being terribly concerned with it.  
Traditional Inuit, for example, specifically devalued those who clung 
to their own possessions.  Reasonable Inuit shared everything they 
owned so that all could live.33  This is not to say that the Inuit were 
right and Locke was wrong any more than it is to claim the reverse.  
Both versions are 'reasonable', given the differing social, cultural, 
and environmental circumstances in which they arose.   
Basing rights on non-religious forms of natural law is no 
more sensible than basing them on religions, and for the same cause: 
one's concept of what is 'natural' is mediated by culture and belief.  
As these vary from society to society, one can only justify the 
primacy of one's own view without relying on the 'common-sense' 
philosophy built into one's own social order--a very hard thing to do.   
Again, there are two possible arguments.  Either reason itself 
varies from society to society, in which case different reasoning will 
lead different peoples to different moral conclusions.34  Or if a 
'universal reason' exists, that 'reason' would deduce a different list of 
rights for each people based on their different circumstances.  In 
neither case is 'reason' a solid scaffold on which to hang a universal 
human rights code. 
I shall later pursue this at some length and so shall not 
attempt to say more about it here.  But I must note that natural law 
theories of rights suffer from the flaws inherent in all rule-based 
theories: that it is always hard to justify the rules on which they are 
built.  Though the philosophers of an earlier time could simple 
assume that their own rules were best, that option is not open to our 
post-imperialist age. 
Legal positivism avoids this problem by basing the rules on 
agreement, nothing more.  Yet one wonders if this is enough.  What 
does one do with a state that follows its own laws and treaties 
perfectly, yet commits genocide?  Is clitoridectomy not a human 
rights violation simply because it has not been recognized as one by 
the international community?  Were religious persecutions not wrong 
before the evening of December 10th, 1948, when Article 18 was 
adopted by the U.N.?  Pure positivism seems wanting. 
A Middle Way? 
Yet if both positivism and natural law theory have flaws--
which my discussion of them has barely touched--there are ways of 
splitting the difference between them.  Huge Grotius (Huig de Groot: 
1583-1645) blended a modified natural law theory with a respect for 
politics to make a set of rules for international conduct that still 
informs modern statecraft.35  Grotius noted that legal positivism 
allows states to be bound only by treaties to which they freely 
consent, yet it does not explain why those treaties should be binding 
when states' interests change.  Pure realpolitik would encourage 
states to break treaties with impunity: to lie, cheat, and steal to 
protect their interests.  Many states have behaved this way, but none 
advocate that all states do so; then no state could believe any other, 
and all promises would vanish in the air. 
Like other natural law theorists, Grotius argued that prior to 
any political organization there exists a law, which he based on 
reason and on the social nature of human beings.  States arise from a 
contract, as Hobbes and Locke said,36 but like Locke he believed that 
rulers cannot freely overturn the laws of reason that necessitated that 
contract's creation.  Human society and the human intellect depend 
on certain principles, among them consistency, order, and a respect 
for conclusions affirmed and promises made.  By sticking to its treaty 
obligations--pacta sunt servanda--states both reaffirm these 
principles and subject themselves to their rule.  In doing so they 
reinforce their own legitimacy.  They could do otherwise, but 
breaking promises undercuts their own raison d'être, which is the 
protection of orderly social life.  This they undertake at their own 
peril. 
Of course, Grotius says much more than this, most of it in a 
natural law vein.37  But by highlighting this thread in his work, one 
can see a middle way between positivist and natural law theories.  In 
a sense, Grotius applies Hobbes' notion of a contract between equal 
persons to a contract between equal states and finds them declaring 
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their subservience to a sovereign principle instead of to a sovereign 
ruler.  States must obey international law because to fail to do so 
would bring about anarchy.  Reason tells states that they need 
international law in order to maintain the international system, even 
though that system's precise structure results from freely-made 
treaties between sovereign entities.  International law is thus created 
by states, which in turn receive their legitimacy from it. 
A step in the same direction is made by some modern legal 
positivists who investigate the presuppositions underlying legal 
norms.  Hans Kelsen, for example, argued that legal systems are 
hierarchical in structure and gain their coherence by their conformity 
to a grundnorm or basic principle.38  A grundnorm is not itself a law; 
rather it is a principle implied by a legal system, in whose light that 
legal system attains intellectual coherence.  When scholars speak of a 
legal norm as a valid norm of the system, they mean that the norm 
conforms to the grundnorm.  For Kelsen, 'natural law', 'justice', and 
so on are all unscientific nonsense, but the grundnorm of a legal 
system is a discoverable entity.  International law plays this role in 
the modern world, by legitimating the sovereign states that act under 
its aegis.  Yet Kelsen's "grundnorm" is much like Grotius's 
"sovereign principle": it both emerges out of international agreement 
and legitimates that agreement.  Can it be the foundation of a human 
rights ethic? 
I shall have to leave the discussion of these approaches to a 
later chapter, where I can pursue them in more depth.  In brief, I shall 
argue that neither approach can ground a universal human rights 
ethic because both the basic principle of a code of justice 
(grundnorm) and the sovereign principle that makes adherence to 
codes of justice possible (pacta sunt servanda) operate at the level of 
ideas.  That is, they are not independent enough of the cultural 
worldviews that place human rights ideas in conflict.  At the same 
time, each approach provides a key that can admit us to a non-
ideational foundation for a universal human rights code.  We must 
cover considerable ground before this foundation emerges, however. 
Both approaches, however, highlight the two-sidedness of 
international human rights law.  As Forsythe puts the matter most 
clearly,  
Human rights law ... establishes a set of rules for all states and 
all people.  It reflects a moral demand for common, universal 
treatment of persons.  It thus seeks to increase world unity and 
to counteract national separateness (but not necessarily all 
national distinctions).  In this sense the international law of 
human rights is revolutionary because it contradicts the notion 
of national sovereignty--that is, that a state can do as it pleases 
in its own jurisdiction.  On the other hand, for the state that 
adheres to international standards on human rights, its 
legitimacy is enhanced and its position made more secure.  
Thus at one and the same time internationally recognized 
human rights constitute a challenge to national sovereignty 
and a source of national security.39
It is worth pointing out that one can still work for human 
rights without choosing between positivist and natural law 
approaches.  Many scholars and activists recognize the importance of 
foundational human rights philosophies, but act as if legal positivism 
were true.   They do not spend their time theorizing, but instead work 
to enforce the rights that now exist and to extend them further 
through treaty action.  To quote Forsythe again,   
Too much emphasis can be placed on theories of rights.  That 
emphasis is bound to magnify abstract differences between 
liberals and conservatives, Marxists and non-Marxists, 
Westerners and non-Westerners, affluent and impoverished.  
One of my continuing objectives is to show that, despite 
various theoretical and philosophical differences which to be 
sure are very real in the world, a great deal of action can be--
and has been--taken in support of human rights.40
Similarly Abdullahi An-Na'im, a legal scholar and former Sudanese 
political prisoner, claims that only by encouraging cross-cultural and 
cross-philosophical conversations can one arrive at universally 
agreed-upon human rights standards.  These standards will not reflect 
any one philosophy, but will reflect an emerging transnational 
consensus of the way social life ought to be ordered.41   
This approach has historical merit: as John Humphrey notes, 
had all the members of the original Human Rights Commission 
insisted on imposing their own philosophical approaches, the 
Universal Declaration would never have been written.42  Natural law 
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theorists may wish that human rights law had more substantive 
philosophical foundations.  True positivists would deny the validity 
of philosophical arguments rather than merely refraining from 
expressing them in the interests of consensus.  One can sometimes 
make practical progress by pushing neither philosophy to its extreme.  
This has its cost, however, in the kinds of dilemmas traced in the first 
chapter.  Fifty years after their first promulgation, the philosophical 
bases of universal human rights must still be revealed. 
Early Human Rights Documents  
Humphrey drafted the first U.N. documents on human rights; 
his practical attitude made possible much of what has been attained 
today.  But he did not lack prior models.  His draft had an intellectual 
genealogy, which, like most such genealogies, tells us as much about 
the limits of the U.N. human rights codes as it does about their 
accomplishments.  That is to say, Humphrey, Saint-Lot, Roosevelt, 
and the other framers of the Universal Declaration had their own 
sense of history and of the historical movement of which they were a 
part.  All people do.  That their belief in cumulative Western 
historical progress toward a universal code of human rights is but one 
possible human rights history, and indeed is a retrospective 
construction, does not lessen their feat; it does, however, give us 
clues about the assumptions with which they labored. 
Western human rights proponents often begin their tale with 
the Magna Carta (1215).43  At least that far back, Western law has 
spoken of individual rights and liberties.  In that charter, England's 
King John  
granted to all freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs 
forever, all the liberties hereinunder written, to be had and 
held by them and their heirs of us and our heirs. 
Then comes a list of more than sixty promises, of both lasting and 
temporary significance.  Some were administrative: the king will 
only appoint bailiffs, constables, sheriffs and other officials who 
know and will obey the laws they are supposed to enforce.44  Others 
protected a person from punishment "unless by the lawful judgment 
of his peers and by the law of the land."   The king must prove 
accused persons guilty of their crimes, pay for seized goods, allow 
freedom of travel, make sure that justice is not bought or sold--in 
short, must rule by law and not by fiat. 
This is, of course, no modern document.  It is less the cradle 
of freedom than a text reforming the late feudal system.  The barons 
who forced John to sign it were as interested in good government as 
they were in liberty; they did not act from a deep belief in the rights 
of the common man.45  Indeed, by its very language, the Magna 
Carta does not see rights inherent in people but grants them as a 
kingly gift.  Still, the seventeenth-century opponents of Stuart 
absolutism thought it the foundation of English freedom, and 
overthrew two kings in its name. 
The first of those revolutions beheaded Charles I (1649); the 
second produced the English Bill of Rights (1689), in which 
Parliament overthrew James II and offered the crown to William of 
Orange.  That bill spoke not so much of individual rights as it did of 
the rights of Parliament: to pass laws, levy taxes, control the army, 
and so on.  Free speech was reserved for parliamentary debates, not 
for the masses outside.  But individuals were to be free to petition the 
King without fear, to be safe from cruel and unusual punishment, to 
have jury trials, and--if Protestants--to be able to keep and bear arms 
as allowable by law.  This is not much by modern standards, but, as 
human rights advocates point out, it went against the absolutism of 
the age.  And unlike the Magna Carta, this document presents itself 
as the product of the "full and free representative[s] of this 
nation...vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties."46
The history of the American Declaration of Independence 
(1776), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
(1789), the United States Constitution (1789) and its Bill of Rights 
(1791) are too well known to need review, though they, too, are part 
of the standard genealogy.  Sometimes lost in this list is the 1776 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Bill of Rights' precursor.47  
Largely the work of George Mason, this document claimed for all the 
rights to  
the Enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the Means of 
acquiring and possessing Property, and pursuing and obtaining 
Happiness and Safety.48
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Power comes from the people, officials are to serve the community 
rather than being served by it, and elections, religion, and the press 
should be free from government interference.  The declaration 
affirms everyone's rights to a trial by peers, to just punishment, and 
to equal application of the law.  In short, it lays the basis of modern 
democratic rule.  Dag Hammarskjold remarked that "what was new 
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights was the formal recognition of 
human rights as part of written constitutional law."49
Each of these steps was a change in law and a change in legal 
philosophy.  Together, say human rights historians, they represent a 
progressive shift toward the view that governments grow out of the 
people that they are supposed to serve.  Though King John would 
never have signed--and his barons would never have asked for--a 
charter that embodied this thinking, King George's American 
subjects demanded it.  The American Revolution was 'conservative' 
in so far as its partisans fought for 'the traditional rights of 
Englishmen' against what they saw as unjust tyranny.  As E.P. 
Thompson has pointed out, a similar defense of 'traditional English 
rights' played a large role in creating the English working class 
during the same era.50  Those rights were not traditional, strictly 
speaking, and they certainly did not arise out of the people's 'natural 
liberties'.  But people thought that they did, which made all the 
difference.  The growth of this popular natural rights philosophy is 
one of the hallmarks of the modern era.   
The First Treaties 
The first international human rights treaties--as opposed to 
philosophies and national constitutions--were not about human rights 
but about warfare.  The 1864 Geneva Convention on the treatment of 
the war wounded granted them access to medical care and assured 
the safety of those who cared for them.  No longer were states to 
target sick and wounded combatants.  No longer were they to use 
medicine as a weapon.  Though the treaty did not use this language, 
it implicitly recognized that individual soldiers had basic rights even 
in warfare; there was a limit beyond which the state could not go.51
There was, unfortunately, no enforcement mechanism, and 
the problem of protecting medical neutrality is with us to this day.52  
States police themselves, with the soft oversight of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.  The role of this organization grew as 
the original treaty was revised in 1906, was supplemented in 1929 by 
a treaty on the treatment of prisoners of war, and was augmented by 
four 1949 treaties--which were themselves reaffirmed in 1977.  
Though these agreements are generally called "international 
humanitarian law", they act as a human rights law for armed combat.   
A second nursery for human rights law was the fight against 
slavery--long a part of many world civilizations.   Though Greek 
slaves were originally war prisoners, other Mediterranean 
civilizations usually recruited slaves among foreigners.53  The early 
Roman term "servus"--the etymological source of serf--was replaced 
in late antiquity by "sclavus", parent to Slav: the general name for 
'barbarians'.  Moslem traders found slaves in both Russia and Africa, 
who could be owned as uncivilized infidels.  Though Bloch notes 
that European slave-holding declined during the Middle Ages, a 
change he attributes to Christianity, Italians kept slaves throughout 
the Middle Ages, usually Russians, Greeks, and Bosnians before the 
fall of Constantinople closed the eastern routes and traders had to 
turn south for their wares.  David Brion Davis notes that the three 
main periods of Western slavery correspond to the three main periods 
of Western expansion: the growth of Rome, of Islam, and of Iberian 
overseas imperialism.  It was thus associated with 'progress' in the 
popular mind.54
This is, of course, just the West.  Africans practiced slavery, 
as did the Chinese, Burmese, Indians, Assamese, and nearly every 
other sedentary people.55  In the Western case, at least, there was 
often some recognition that one did not enslave one's own kind, 
however this might be defined.  The mid-15th century arguments 
about the enslaveability of the 'newly discovered' peoples revolved 
around the question of their likeness to European Christians.  Did 
they have souls, so they could be Christianized?  And if so, could 
they still be enslaved?  As is usual in politics, the parties 
compromised and Christian henceforth owned Christian.  The 
economic logic of slavery in this period was too strong.56
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A cultural logic stood against this pressure, however--one that 
eventually triumphed.  From the early 1700s, American and British 
Quakers opposed slavery as a crime against the human spirit.  
Combining a belief in human spiritual equality with an active 
moralism, they lobbied their governments to end the slave trade and 
to free slaves within their dominions.  Their efforts resonated with 
other pietistic Protestants, enlisting their aid.  Interestingly, it was 
Britain, rather than the United States, in which this movement first 
bore major fruit.  Though her merchants had long dominated slaving, 
Britain outlawed it in 1807--at a considerable economic cost.  
Twenty-six years later, she abolished slavery in her dominions at a 
cost of some 20 million pounds compensation to slave owners.57  
This is not the place to decide whether slavery fell out of moral 
advancement or from its own economic inefficiency.  Certainly 
abolitionists played the moral card by arguing that slaves possessed 
the same rights as their masters.  In any case, all of the major 
Western nations followed Britain's lead, Brazil being the last to 
succumb in 1888.58
Europe--particularly Britain--then tried to outlaw slavery in 
the rest of the world, without total success.  Various treaties banned 
the practice, as did various governments--most recently the 
governments of Mauritania (1986) and Bahrain (1990).  The 
conventions of 1919 and 1926, supplemented in the 1950s, imbedded 
the ban in international law.59  But these victories came late. 
The third main source of early human rights law was the 
League of Nations.  Though by no means powerful, the League was 
the first international organization to try to protect individuals--even 
if not directly but through the medium of states.  League action 
focused on three areas of concern: minority rights, labor rights, and 
the rights of persons in the former German colonies, now 
administered as League Mandates. 
Humphrey himself argues that the League's work on 
minorities was its most important contribution to later U.N. efforts.60  
The various "minority treaties" that accompanied the Versailles 
Peace of 1919 were designed to protect the inhabitants of the former 
Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian Empires who were now 
subjects of various national states.  The Polish Minority Treaty, for 
example, outlined the rights of the former subjects of Russia and 
Germany to become either citizens of Poland or of their former 
rulers.  It also decreed that  
Article 7: All Polish nationals shall be equal before the 
law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without 
distinction as to race, language, or religion. 
Differences of religion, creed, or confession shall not 
prejudice any Polish national ... 
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any 
Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in 
commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any 
kind ... 
Article 8: Polish nationals who belong to racial, 
religious, or linguistic minorities ... shall have an equal right to 
establish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, 
religious, and social institutions, schools and other educational 
establishments ...61
The treaty went on to highlight the special rights of Jews and to 
allow any member state of the League of Nations Council to bring a 
complaint if the Polish Government violated any minority's rights.  
Significantly, Poland agreed to submit such disputes to the Court of 
International Justice--a major compromise of its national sovereignty.  
But only states could complain, not individuals.  The other treaties 
had similar provisions. 
Legally, these acts grew out of an established international 
law doctrine--one that gave each state the right to protect its citizens 
from other governments.  If a citizen of Country X was mistreated by 
the rulers of Country Y, Country X was due compensation--not the 
mistreated individual.  States would sometimes extend protection to a 
foreign minority with which they had some affiliation, as in the case 
of Louis XIV's Proclamation of French Protection of the Maronite 
Community in Lebanon (1649).  The nineteenth century saw several 
such European efforts to help minorities under the Turks--efforts that 
were often imperialism in disguise.  For it was not really the 
individual's interests that were protected, but the country's.  
International law was still a state-to-state matter. 
The Polish and other minority treaties did not work well.  
They failed to impede tyrannous majorities and fell victim to Nazi 
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expansionism.  Yet they represented an important principle.  Not 
only were individual rights explicitly laid out, and members of 
minority groups seen as having rights to languages, religions, and 
cultural practices that separated them from the rest of their fellow 
citizens.  But national majorities were enjoined to tolerate cultural 
minorities as groups, not just as disparate individuals.  Though not 
totally overt, this notion of 'cultural' or 'group rights' would emerge in 
the 1970s as an important human rights issue--one that has not been 
resolved to date. 
Labor rights treaties fared somewhat better.  The International 
Labor Organization--also set up by the Versailles Treaty--spent much 
of the inter-war years working for internationally recognized labor 
standards: for hours, pay, pensions, safety, and so on.  It produced 
two treaties, one on the unionization of farm workers and another 
placing restrictions on forced labor.  Though really a negotiating 
rather than a legislative body, the ILO was popular enough with its 
constituent governments that it was absorbed into the U.N. after the 
second war.  It produced six new treaties on labor standards while the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission was taking up formal human rights 
work.  In subsequent years it produced many more.  
Though less effective administratively, the League of Nations 
Territorial Mandates were the first field in which an international 
body claimed jurisdiction over the way governments treat 
individuals.  Rather than having full sovereignty, the Mandate 
Authorities supposedly worked under the oversight of the Mandate 
Commission.  Individuals could not appear before the Commission, 
yet it was supposed to represent their interests.  In essence the 
League claimed sovereign power, which it delegated to the various 
colonial powers.  But this in itself was new.  For the first time, an 
international body claimed independent authority over persons--and 
held other sovereigns to account on their behalf.  As Forsythe 
remarks, "this would not be the last time that a human rights 
provision was more important for long-term developments than 
short-term protection."62
In all these fields, a discernible shift was taking place in 
international law.  The doctrine of state sovereignty had originally 
given rulers sole voice in how they were to treat their subjects.  That 
is, the rights of citizens were a matter of domestic, not international 
concern.  Though "the theoretical basis of human rights is the 
predominantly Western concept that individuals have a claim to 
autonomy and freedom in the face of governmental authority," this 
was manifestly not how states did business with one another.  
Oppenheim's 1912 classic summation of international law accurately 
proclaimed that "the Law of Nations is a law between States only and 
exclusively."63
By the time that Lauterpacht revised Oppenheim's text some 
forty years later, however, much had changed.  He was still able to 
write that "the Law of Nations is primarily a law between States," 
[italics added] but noted that states have granted rights to individuals 
to such an extent that "there must be an increasing disposition to treat 
individuals, within a limited sphere, as subjects of International 
Law."  Though he denied that international law itself guaranteed 
individual rights as yet, he noted that the reference to rights in the 
U.N. Charter "has inaugurated a new and decisive departure with 
regard to this abiding problem of law and government."  He looked 
forward to changes in positive law that would make this so.64
A Note about Genealogical History 
The history I have just recounted--tracing human rights from 
the Magna Carta to the ILO--is something more than it seems.  It is a 
history, true enough, but it is also a genealogy: a record of the 
remembered forebears of the current human rights program.  As 
Edmund Leach notes about the Hebrew Bible,65 genealogies say a lot 
about the cultural lives of those who tell them.  Such a 'history' is, of 
course, a reconstruction based on a particular image of the present: 
we see where we think we are and so look backwards to see who or 
what got us here.  The human rights genealogy is, moreover, like all 
genealogical histories, not totally factual and not the only possible 
reconstruction of the past.  Each of these points needs to be 
explained. 
The first point is not difficult, but is key to the others.  Just as 
nations are not natural, but are "imagined communities", to use 
Benedict Anderson's phrase, so too histories are not natural but are 
remembered.  We recount the past from the standpoint of the present.  
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Our image of that present tells us what to look for: which ancestors 
to favor, which to shun, and so on.  What we find there, of course, 
may revise our sense of the present, but more often the resulting 
story reinforces our image of ourselves.  This is especially true with 
genealogies, whose prime purpose is to tell us (and others) who we 
are. 
The genealogical history I have just told emphasizes progress; 
it portrays human rights emerging triumphant into the modern world.  
Though the precursors I have just cited all exist, there are more 
negative precursors that I could just as easily have included.  Take 
the 1857 Dred Scott decision, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied persons of African ancestry the protections of the 
Constitution.  This was not 'progress'; it took away rights that seventy 
other Court cases had previously assumed slaves possessed.  
Similarly, Pitt's moves against the English working classes during the 
Napoleonic wars eroded their traditional rights.  British courts 
routinely voided laws that supported workers against their 
employers, even if those laws had stood for centuries.  The collapse 
of human rights in Nazi Germany--until then the one of the strongest 
defenders of the rule of law--is only a particularly egregious case of 
retrogression.  A genealogy of human rights 'progress' is as much a 
wish as a reality.66
Factually, some of that history's genealogical icons were not 
understood in their time as we understand them today.  For example, 
Orlando Patterson describes the relative weakness of the 'rights' 
concept in the American colonies.  He notes that 'liberty' was then a 
much more important notion, and that the Lockean ideal of natural 
rights bloomed only for Americans in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century.  'Rights' justified rebellion, and they gave 'liberty' 
something to stand on when newly independent colonists could no 
longer appeal to their 'traditional liberties' under English common 
law.   
So a strange thing happened in the history of rights.  
Immediately after the triumph of rights rhetoric in the 
enactment of the American Bill of Rights, the Bill and the 
whole tradition of rhetoric surrounding it quickly sank to 
insignificance.  Indeed, several states had not even bothered to 
ratify it, Massachusetts and Connecticut eventually getting 
around to doing so only in 1937! 
Lead by Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court ruled in 1833 that 
the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government, not to the 
states.  And the Slaughterhouse cases of 1873 reduced the 14th 
Amendment (granting citizenship rights to all races) to 
meaninglessness by claiming that states did not have to obey them--
and so were free to brutalize anyone without legal limit.  Surely this 
is not a record of consistent progress toward human rights for all!67
Besides, there are alternate genealogies that could be written.  
As we shall see in the next chapter, there are Chinese and Islamic 
human rights histories that could have been tapped.  Each of these 
traditions has its human rights precursors and opponents, and each 
had different kinds of battles between them.  Even within the 
Western tradition, one can see the disparities between French and 
English approaches.  The former's constitutionalism and the latter's 
base in common law are merely the surface manifestations of 
fundamentally unlike tales.  French liberty challenged the Old 
Regime's social structure, though that Regime was not unambiguous 
darkness, as Robert Darnton has shown.  English liberty defended an 
older structure, lost, and reemerged as trade unionism with a different 
concept of rights than the industrial classes it opposed.  Both 
contributed to human rights, but they did so in different ways and in 
different modes.68   
My point is not that the modern human rights movement 
sprang into existence without history; just the opposite.  The past 
made a great deal of difference to the kind of human rights embodied 
in the Universal Declaration.  But the focus of that recounted history 
on the West and the picture of human rights progressively emerging 
out of previous darkness are just that: pictures, not reality.  Where we 
see a progressive unfolding of democracy and of the rights of the 
individual, we could just as easily have seen a battle between evenly 
matched foes.  Where we see the West leading us toward the freedom 
of the individual, we could see the East leading us toward an ordered 
and good society.  Both images are 'correct', but each is constructed 
from the point of view of the present.  The diplomats centered at the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission picked one view, which shaped the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights they created.  It is to that 
shaping that we now turn.   
Approving the Universal Declaration  
Shortly after its founding, the U.N. Economic and Social 
Council established a Human Rights Commission, which first met in 
January, 1947.69  Under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, it was 
charged to report to the Council regarding: 
(a) an international bill of rights; 
(b) international declarations or conventions on civil liberties, 
the status of women, freedom of information and similar 
matters; 
(c) the protection of minorities; 
(d) the prevention of discrimination on grounds of race, sex, 
language, or religion; 
(e) any other matter concerning human rights not covered by 
(a), (b), (c), and (d).70
The Commission soon set up Sub-Commissions on Freedom of 
Information and of the Press, on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, and on the Status of Women.71  It kept 
for itself the task of producing a general Bill of Rights.  This was a 
wise move.  While the sub-commissions were composed of specially-
chosen experts and professionals, the HRC was made up of 
governments' representatives.  They were in a much better position to 
do the hard negotiating that a human rights treaty required. 
Yet no treaty came forth.  Within six months of the first 
meeting it had became clear that the emerging ideological division 
between East and West would prevent any quick agreement on a 
formal human rights pact.  With some reluctance, it was decided to 
split the task in two.  The HRC would produce a general manifesto 
but would leave questions of enforcement to a detailed covenant, 
which it hoped to complete within a year or two.  Though this tactic 
allowed the Commission to get a Universal Declaration through 
quickly, no one imagined that the Cold War would block the 
enforcing agreements for another 18 years.72
The various draft human rights documents that appeared in 
the course of the HRC deliberations were clearly written in the 
positivist tradition.  That is, they ignored the philosophical 
justification of human rights in favor of getting as many nations as 
possible to sign on.  This decision, too, was politic.  The main 
substantive divide was between the Western democracies, which 
wanted to affirm political freedoms, and the East Bloc, which 
focused on economic and social rights.  Yet there were enough 
philosophical differences on just the western side to prevent any 
quick unity.  The Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur of the first Human 
Rights Commission, for example, were respectively Dr. Peng-Chun 
Chang, a renowned Confucianist, and Dr. Charles Malik, a Lebanese 
Thomistic Christian.  Their learned debates entertained many a 
delegate, but hardly settled the conceptual issues.  HRC Chairman 
Roosevelt often had to bring their philosophical flights back to the 
business at hand.   
With John Humphrey, the head of the Human Rights Division 
of the U.N. Secretariat, Roosevelt formed a small drafting committee 
to put forth a preliminary document.  At first made up of themselves, 
Chang, and Malik, it soon added the representatives of Australia, 
Chile, France, the U.S.S.R., and the U.K.  Based on Humphrey's 
model, France's Dr. René Cassin prepared a second and then a third 
draft;73 these formed the basis of discussions at the HRC's December 
1947 meeting in Geneva.  Modified somewhat there, it was further 
revised through consultations with the member governments and 
passed with one abstention at the next HRC meeting in June, 1948.74
The arguments that arose in these sessions show the depth of 
the differences between the various advocates of human rights, as 
well as the depth of division between the governments involved.  The 
American State Department, for example, wanted "a carbon copy of 
the American Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights."  The 
Soviet Union wanted economic and social rights, with--the 
Americans feared--"the less said about freedom of speech, the right 
to a fair trial, etc., the better."75  Roosevelt herself was open to both 
kinds of rights, but Chang saw the Western biases both contained.  
He twitted Humphrey about this, suggesting that whoever wrote the 
first draft Declaration should first spend a year in China studying 
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Confucianism.  Otherwise, the Declaration would be Euro-American, 
not universal.76   
The philosophic fights did not always divide on political 
lines.  Malik expressed the most extreme individualism, arguing that 
the human person is "prior to" and more important than the group 
and can thus alone be the judge of right and wrong.  The British 
representative--a trade unionist--responded that "there is no such 
thing as complete personal freedom": individual, group, and state are 
interdependent and the rights and duties of one are meaningless 
without the others.  Cassin supported this, but Ribnikar, the 
Yugoslavian representative, went further.  He claimed that 
individualistic notions of rights only reflect the ideals of the middle 
classes; as those classes had become "obsolete", the international bill 
of rights should focus on economic issues, so as to "be in conformity 
with the aspirations of the popular masses of the world."  They 
should thus delete the right to property, the rights to life and to 
personal liberty, and the prohibition against compulsory labor, 
among others.  This was not acceptable to Roosevelt, who thought 
such rights adhered to individuals.   
In the end, Humphrey did not read Confucius, but his draft 
contained both civil/political and economic/social rights, the "first-
generation" and "second-generation" rights mentioned in the 
preceding chapter.  Both were retained in the subsequent drafts and 
in the Universal Declaration.  There, Articles 1 through 21 focus on 
civil and political liberties, with some additions to the traditional 
list--the right to equality in marriage being one.  Articles 22 through 
28 provide rights to social security, an adequate standard of living, 
education, cultural life, and to "a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be 
fully realized"--all second-generation matters. 
The conferees finessed the philosophic issues whenever 
possible.  They changed an early draft's statement that all humans are 
"created" free and equal to "born" to avoid conflict with the East 
Bloc's official atheism; everyone could agree that all people are born, 
but not that a Creator made things so.  They refrained from listing 
partisan principles from which human rights supposedly sprang.  
They beat back Malik's attempt to guarantee the right to life "from 
the moment of conception"--an issue as rancorous then as it is today.  
They even dropped the few philosophic principles that Humphrey's 
first draft had included, such as the notion that individuals are 
citizens not only of their states but of the world.  On the other hand, 
they bowed to the request of the Commission on Women to make the 
Declaration gender-neutral.  The Universal Declaration thus refers 
not to "men" but to "every human" and "everyone." 
Roosevelt consistently argued that the Declaration must be 
acceptable to all 58 U.N. members.  This meant considerable 
politicking and frequent compromise for the sake of particular 
sensibilities.  For example, American Under-Secretary of State 
Robert Lovett insisted that the Preamble call on members to 
"promote" human rights rather than "enforce" them.  Soviets and 
Americans together voted to remove individuals' right to petition the 
U.N. directly.  The Americans agreed to support the list of economic 
and social rights, but only if governments were to "promote" rather 
than "guarantee" them.  (At this, the Soviet representative remarked 
that he understood the U.S. position, because capitalism could never 
guarantee full employment; perhaps the U.S. needed to try a different 
economic system!)  Though the smaller countries wanted a firmer 
document, and Roosevelt herself would have been happy to see one, 
the great powers prevailed.  Roosevelt satisfied herself with a 
commitment from her government to back a formal human rights 
treaty as soon as practicable. 
Not all politicking was benign.  By mid-1948, the Soviet 
government had apparently decided to obstruct progress toward a 
Declaration.  Representative Alexei Pavlov announced that the HRC 
should throw out the Geneva draft and begin again from first 
principles--Soviet ones.  When that motion failed, he proposed 
amending each and every article so that rights would be valid only 
"according to the laws of the state."  The "right to leave any country, 
including his own" would then be limited by domestic law--
effectively nullifying that right for Soviet citizens.  Other rights 
would suffer as well.  Roosevelt concluded that the Soviet Union had 
grown dubious of an accord that gave individuals rights against the 
state and gave the state duties toward its citizens.  As that was the 
whole point of the Universal Declaration, she rallied the HRC to vote 
her way.   
Page 15 
Spickard: "The Origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" 
The HRC finished its work in June, 1948, and the U.N. 
General Assembly took up the draft Declaration at its September 
meeting in Paris.  Its Third Committee77 spent eighty-one sessions on 
the Declaration and considered one hundred and sixty-eight 
resolutions containing amendments.  It examined each article in 
detail, rehashing many of the debates that had taken place in the 
HRC.  In the end, the draft stayed much as it was, though the issues 
raised in the debate are instructive.  Catholics in both Europe and 
Latin America tried to reinsert God and natural law as the 
foundations on which rights depend.  Moslems objected to its support 
for freedom of marriage and religion, noting that the Qu'ran forbids 
Moslem women to marry outside their religion and forbids Believers 
to embrace other creeds.  South Africa argued that the document 
went beyond truly universal rights to impose a particular social and 
political system; her representative especially opposed the articles 
supporting freedom of residence and the right of everyone to 
participate in government, which would undermine the apartheid 
regime.78   
Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union argued that the 
Declaration interfered in the internal affairs of sovereign states--a 
violation of the U.N. Charter.  Interestingly, they also complained 
that it did not protect the linguistic and cultural rights of national 
minorities, which many countries found to be just such 
interferences.79  And they argued that its definition of the right to 
free speech would protect 'fascist speech' as well as 'democratic 
speech'; they favored a modifying the speech clause to guarantee the 
right of every person "freely to express and disseminate democratic 
views, and to combat fascism."80   
Most major changes were defeated.  The Third Committee 
approved the draft Declaration on December 6th by a roll-call vote of 
29 to none, with 7 abstentions.81  The same issues were brought up 
again in the General Assembly debate on December 9th and 10th, but 
again the vote was favorable.  A Soviet motion to delay lost, a British 
motion to collapse two articles into one was approved, and the 
Declaration won by a vote of 48 to none, with 8 abstentions.  The 
Communist Bloc, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa were the only 
holdouts. 
Roosevelt remarked to a Paris audience that she had once 
thought she had reached the limits of human patience raising her 
children; now she knew that this was nothing to the patience that 
international diplomacy required.82
Conflicting Concepts 
At the time, the chief conflict seemed to be between 
advocates of first- and second-generation rights: i.e., between the 
Western-democratic and the Communist worlds.  A second conflict 
was over the exact status of the Declaration: as legal document or as 
moral authority, though this did not stand in the way of approval.83  
Though still alive, these conflicts seem not so important today. 
Below the surface, however, there were other contradictions.  
Chang failed in his attempt to have the delegates take Confucianism 
seriously, largely because few of them knew anything about Asian 
philosophy.  He was (barely) able to keep references to "God" and 
"nature" out of the document by reminding them that not all people 
think in these Western terms.  But the best he could hope for was a 
text that would not obviously offend East Asians, even though it did 
not express their views.  A pragmatist, he thought the Declaration the 
best possible under the circumstances, though far from universal.84
The Moslem critique was more direct, and Roosevelt worried 
that it would lead several countries to abandon the human rights 
effort.  The Saudi Arabian delegate--ironically another Lebanese 
Christian--argued that the freedom to change one's religion was one 
that the Qu'ran did not grant to Moslems but only to other people.  
Saudi Arabia feared that declaring this right would unleash hordes of 
Western missionaries seeking to undercut the religious stability of 
the Middle East.  Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria all spoke for 
Saudi Arabia in the Third Committee, as did Egypt in the General 
Assembly.  The Pakistani delegate spoke against them in the latter 
debate, however, attributing the concern to a textual 
misunderstanding.  All but the Saudis voted for the Declaration. 
Even the Communist challenge did not merely involve the 
relative merits of economic as opposed to political rights, but also a 
different notion of the relationship between the individual and the 
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state.  Roosevelt was right to think that the Soviets opposed an 
accord that gave individuals prime authority, but she was probably 
not right to think that they did so just out of opportunism.  As we 
shall see later, 'socialist morality' is not based in the individual.  
Though the East Bloc's arguments may have been disingenuous, they 
were not senseless.  One can make a competent case for a socialist 
human rights philosophy, but the rights it supports are quite different 
from those that the Declaration enshrines. 
Politically speaking, Roosevelt was wise to keep overt 
philosophy out of the Declaration, even if a covert philosophy 
remained.  John Humphrey admitted in his memoirs that his "draft 
attempted to combine humanitarian liberalism with social 
democracy"--certainly not aphilosophical points of view.85  But the 
document did avoid specifying any particular basis for the equality of 
rights, even though most of the delegates would have liked to have 
included one.  It thus took an implicit positive-law approach: human 
rights are exactly what states agree them to be.  Whether that 
agreement is enough to enforce human rights for all is still a question 
today. 
If one measures the success of this positivist strategy by the 
extent to which states have ratified human rights treaties, the 
approach is not doing so well.  Of the 20-odd worldwide human 
rights treaties in force as of this writing, most have been ratified by 
fewer than two-thirds of the world's states.  Only three-quarters of the 
states have ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights--the enforcement provisions that Roosevelt sought 
but which were so long delayed.  About a third--not including the 
U.S.--have ratified the latter's Optional Protocol, which lets 
individuals petition the U.N. about rights violations.  The U.S. has 
also not ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, among others.  And it has registered reservations about 
several of the treaties it has approved.86  The Appendix lists the 
relevant treaties and the number of states that have agreed to them as 
of this writing.  It seems that "positive law" is not as positive as it 
might like to be. 
While past treaties sit unratified, new agreements, 
declarations, and so on, have come to the fore.  World bodies have 
now proposed not just first- and second-generation but third-
generation rights: to peace, to development, to a clean environment, 
and to humanitarian assistance, among others.  Their very 
controversiality underscores the limits of legal positivism as a human 
rights framework.  If "human rights is what the law says it is," to 
recall Forsythe's words, what undergirds that law?  What happens 
when the law changes?  What happens when states do not ratify 
agreements they sign?  And what happens when states and peoples 
cease to agree with treaties they signed previously, or which were 
negotiated by previous regimes?  To say that the positivist approach 
fails to give human rights conceptual stability is putting it mildly. 
Already in 1948, the U.N. debate touched on several 
conceptual challenges to the list of rights contained in the Universal 
Declaration--even to any list that claims cross-cultural university.  
The next two chapters will survey the challenges raised by 
Confucian, Moslem, Communist, Fascist, & indigenous "rights" 
philosophies.  I contend that we must take these challenges seriously 
if we are to emerge with a human rights philosophy that is truly 
universal. 
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